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Fair Housing and Roommates: Contesting a
Presumption of Constitutionality
I. INTRODUCTION
Gene Kavenoki wanted to rent out a room in his apartment to a
stable person with whom he could get along well.1 Unaware that he
was engaging in multiple violations of federal law, the graduate
student posted the following advertisement on Roommates.com: “I
am not looking for freaks, geeks, prostitutes (male or female),
druggies, pet cobras, drama, black Muslims or mortgage brokers.”2
Responding to allegations that he was discriminating on the basis of
race, Kavenoki explained that he was doing “no such thing,” but was
instead “discriminating against people who don’t share my slightly
warped sense of humor.”3
Although Kavenoki intended only to find a suitable roommate,
his advertisement violated section 3604(c) of the Fair Housing Act
(“FHA”) because the language of the advertisement was facially
discriminatory on both racial and religious grounds.4 While, under
an exception to the FHA,5 Kavenoki could legally discriminate6—

1. See Adam Liptak, Fair Housing, Free Speech and Choosy Roommates, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 22, 2007, at A12, available at http://select.nytimes.com/2007/01/22/us/22bar.html.
2. Id. Various fair-housing councils sued Roommates.com in 2004 alleging that
Roommates.com was liable under the Fair Housing Act for advertisements, which were similar
to Kavenoki’s advertisement, placed on Roommates.com’s website. See Fair Hous. Council of
San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding that
Roommates.com may be liable for a subscriber’s Fair Housing Act violation and remanding the
case for a judgment on whether Roommates.com violated the Fair Housing Act).
3. Liptak, supra note 1.
4. Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601–19 (2006). FHA § 3604(c) states that it is
unlawful to
make, print, or publish, or cause to be made, printed, or published any notice,
statement, or advertisement, with respect to the sale or rental of a dwelling that
indicates any preference, limitation, or discrimination based on race, color, religion,
sex, handicap, familial status, or national origin, or an intention to make any such
preference, limitation, or discrimination.
5. Id. § 3603(b)(2) (stating that the discrimination prohibition in section 3604(c)
does not apply if “rooms or units in dwellings containing living quarters occupied or intended
to be occupied by no more than four families living independently of each other, if the owner
actually maintains and occupies one of such living quarters as his residence”).
6. Id.
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based on race, religion, or any other basis—in his actual roommate
choice, he could not legally declare his discriminatory intentions or
criteria in an advertisement.
Kavenoki’s situation underscores the incongruous effects of the
FHA on those searching for a roommate: Although someone
looking for a roommate is making a choice about a person to share
living spaces and private circumstances, the person looking for a
roommate may not put personal preferences in a roommate
advertisement. Additionally, while someone looking for a roommate
may actually discriminate in making his choice, he may not state his
“discriminatory” preferences in his advertisement.
This Comment argues that section 3604(c) of the FHA is
unconstitutional as applied to roommate choice.7 Specifically, section
3604(c) is unconstitutional under the First Amendment as embodied
in the commercial speech doctrine and in the right to freedom of
intimate association.8 Because real tension exists between antidiscrimination policies and constitutional rights, Congress and the
courts must carefully consider how to best accommodate both core
constitutional rights and important anti-discrimination policies.
This Comment will first introduce the FHA and the historic
treatment of the current question in Part II. Part III will argue that
section 3604(c) of the FHA is unconstitutional under the
commercial speech doctrine. Part IV will argue that section 3604(c)
is also unconstitutional under the right to freedom of intimate
association. Part V will discuss the importance of anti-discrimination
laws and the costs and benefits of three possible options that attempt
to accommodate both individual constitutional rights and antidiscrimination policies. Part VI will provide a brief conclusion.

7. This Comment uses the term “roommate” but presumes that “roommate” is
synonymous with “housemate,” “shared living,” and similar terms.
8. The unconstitutionality of section 3604(c) can be argued on many other bases. See
John T. Messerly, Roommate Wanted: The Right to Choice in Shared Living, 93 IOWA L. REV.
1949 (2008). Messerly considers all of the following as invalidating section 3604(c) in the
roommate context: the right to privacy, intimate and expressive association, free exercise of
religion, and freedom of speech. Messerly’s analysis of expressive association (based on the
assumption that some individuals in shared-living arrangements, such as halfway houses or
homes for the elderly, consider whether to express a message); free exercise of religion (based
on the idea that, although facially neutral, housing discrimination laws also violate other
constitutionally protected freedoms and are therefore also suspect on freedom of religion
grounds); and freedom of speech are facially and substantively flimsier arguments.
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II. THE FAIR HOUSING ACT

The FHA, which has its roots in emotionally charged historical
practices, contains provisions that put some individuals, including
those seeking roommates, in a precarious position. While courts have
generally rejected assertions that portions of the FHA are
unconstitutional, their rejection is unfounded because these claims
rest on strong constitutional doctrines and absolutely merit
attention.
A. Introduction to the Fair Housing Act
1. The historical background
In 1968, Congress enacted the FHA9 in a desperate attempt to
reduce racial discrimination in housing.10 Although it had been two
decades since the Supreme Court had found that the enforcement of
racially discriminatory housing covenants violated the Equal
Protection Clause,11 racial discrimination in housing was still
rampant and discrimination had merely retreated to less transparent
forms.12 For example, mortgage lenders refused to make loans to
individuals in minority-predominant neighborhoods, loan application
procedures discouraged minorities, and marketing policies often
excluded minority areas.13
In the 1960s, riots in urban areas made the need for change
blatantly apparent. Trying to understand the urban dynamic, the
government created the National Advisory Commission on Civil
Disorders. The Commission’s findings were clear: segregation and
discrimination were creating “frustrations of powerlessness” that

9. When Congress first passed fair housing legislation in 1968, the legislation was part
of the Civil Rights Act. See Civil Rights Act of 1968, § 801–20 (current version at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 3601–19 (2006)). This Comment refers to Congress’s 1968 fair housing legislation and all
of Congress’s subsequent fair housing legislation as the “Fair Housing Act.”
10. Diane J. Klein & Charles Doskow, Housingdiscrimination.com?: The Ninth Circuit
(Mostly) Puts Out the Welcome Mat for Fair Housing Act Suits Against Roommate-Matching
Websites, 38 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 329, 339–40 (giving a brief overview of the
discriminating housing practices of the time).
11. Id. at 339; see also Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 20 (1948).
12. Klein & Doskow, supra note 10, at 339–40.
13. Id.; see also JONATHAN BROWN & CHARLES BENNINGTON, RACIAL REDLINING: A
STUDY OF RACIAL DISCRIMINATION BY BANKS AND MORTGAGE COMPANIES IN THE UNITED
STATES (1993).
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contributed significantly to the nationwide disorder.14 The
Commission suggested that Congress take action to promote
antidiscrimination, empowerment, and integration. Relying on these
findings and on a growing certainty that action was necessary to
prevent further disorder, the Senate passed the FHA on March 14,
1968.15
While the FHA waited on House approval, the assassination of
Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., on April 4 added an exclamation mark
to the warnings of the Commission’s report.16 Following rioting
across the country, the House passed the FHA on April 10.
President Johnson signed the FHA into law the next day.17
2. The Fair Housing Act’s provisions that are relevant to roommate
selection
The FHA declares that it is U.S. policy to “provide, within
constitutional limitations, for fair housing throughout the United
States.”18 Section 3604 of the FHA originally made it unlawful to
discriminate in selling or renting due to a prospective buyer’s or
renter’s “race, color, religion, or national origin.”19 Congress added
protection of sex in 1974 and protection of familial status and
handicap in 1988.20
While the language of the FHA is broad, it provides a few
exceptions. The most famous of these, the “Mrs. Murphy
Exception,” allows the owner of housing to discriminate in his
tenant choice where the owner (1) owns living quarters intended for
four or fewer families and (2) personally lives in one of the four
units.21 Individuals seeking a roommate fall into this exception

14. Brian Patrick Larkin, The Forty-Year “First Step”: The Fair Housing Act as an
Incomplete Tool for Suburban Integration, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1617, 1621–23 (2007); see
also John O. Calmore, Race/ism Lost and Found: The Fair Housing Act at Thirty, 52 U. MIAMI
L. REV. 1067, 1068–69 (1998).
15. Larkin, supra note 14, at 1623–24; see also Calmore, supra note 14, at 1068–69.
16. Larkin, supra note 14, at 1624.
17. Id.
18. 42 U.S.C. § 3601 (2006).
19. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a)–(b) (1976).
20. Housing and Community Development Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-383, § 109,
88 Stat. 633 (1974); Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-430, 102 Stat.
1619 (1988).
21. See 42 U.S.C. § 3603(b)(2); Bills v. Hodges, 628 F.2d 844, 845 n.1 (4th Cir.
1980). Although the language of the provision applies only to “owners,” the courts,
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because they own fewer than four units (or generally do not own any
units) and live on the premises. Thus, the FHA does not prohibit
them from discriminating in their roommate choice.
Regardless of whether an individual fits into the Mrs. Murphy
Exception and may legally discriminate, the FHA still prohibits
discriminatory housing statements and advertisements. Specifically,
section 3604(c) states that an advertisement of, or any intention to
advertise, a “preference, limitation, or discrimination” based on race,
color, religion, sex, handicap, or familial status is illegal.22
Consequently, while a person may legally rent out her basement only
to a “good Muslim couple” or a “church-going Christian man,” she
may not indicate this preference in an advertisement.
B. Courts Generally Hold that Section 3604(c) is Constitutional
In the forty years since Congress passed the FHA, multiple
parties have asserted that section 3604(c), in prohibiting housing
advertisements
that
indicate
discriminatory
intent,
is
unconstitutional. In each case, the court dismissed the constitutional
claims.23 After forty years of accepting the constitutionality of section
3604(c), it is no surprise that courts and scholars generally view
claims of unconstitutionality with deep skepticism.24

newspapers, and others involved in fair housing widely recognize that the provision also applies
to renters or lessees who invite others to live with them as roommates. See Equal Housing
Covers Roommates Too!, http://www.equalhousingonthenet.com/ (last visited Nov. 2,
2009); Fair Housing and Equal Opportunity, http://www.wheelerdeeler.com/
housing.aspx#roommates (last visited Nov. 2, 2009); LAmarketplace.com, Fair Housing
Notice: All Roommate/Real Estate Adv., http://la.kaango.com/feViewAd/12630714 (last
visited Nov. 2, 2009).
22. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(c) (2006).
23. See, e.g., United States v. Space Hunters, Inc., 429 F.3d 416, 425 (2d Cir. 2005);
Ragin v. N.Y. Times Co., 923 F.2d 995, 1002–03 (2d Cir. 1991); United States v. Hunter,
459 F.2d 205, 211 (4th Cir. 1972). Most recently, the Ninth Circuit considered this issue in
Fair Housing Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157 (9th
Cir. 2008). See supra note 2.
24. Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley, 521 F.3d at 1164; see also Klein &
Doskow, supra note 10, at 374 (“Such arguments are not especially promising when it comes
to violations of § 3604(c).”); Jeffrey M. Sussman, Cyberspace: An Emerging Safe Haven for
Housing Discrimination, 19 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 194, 200 (2007) (providing a similar
response); Jennifer C. Chang, In Search of Fair Housing in Cyberspace: The Implications of the
Communications Decency Act for Fair Housing on the Internet, 55 STAN. L. REV. 969, 1006
(2002) (providing a similar response). But see Posting of Dave Fagundes to PrawfsBlawg,
http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/first_amendment/page/2/ (Feb. 15, 2006,
06:38 AM); Posting of Will Baude to PrawfsBlawg, http://prawfsblawg.blogs.
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Although courts and scholars generally dismiss the idea that
section 3604(c) is unconstitutional, their reasons are largely
unfounded and are based in part on the perpetuation of bad law.
Not only is the commercial speech doctrine incompatible with
section 3604(c), but the right to freedom of intimate association
likely also protects roommate choice. The following analysis should
influence courts and legislatures as they formulate and consider the
constitutionality of laws that restrict a person’s ability to advertise for
a roommate.
III. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF SECTION 3604(C) IN LIGHT OF
THE COMMERCIAL SPEECH DOCTRINE
In a recent case, Judge Easterbrook wrote that “any rule that
forbids truthful advertising of a transaction that would be
substantively lawful encounters serious problems under the first
amendment [sic].”25 Since the FHA was passed in 1968,
fundamental shifts in the protection of commercial speech have gone
unrecognized to the extent that they apply to housing
advertisements. This Part considers developments in the commercial
speech doctrine and how the courts have ignored these
developments by perpetuating old law. This Part also argues that
section 3604(c), which restricts individuals from advertising the
discriminatory criteria they use in roommate selection, is
unconstitutional.
A. The Commercial Speech Doctrine
Commercial speech is exactly what it sounds like—speech made
for a commercial purpose and, generally, with the intent of making a
profit. Advertisements are a classic form of commercial speech. While
it is now understood that the First Amendment protects commercial
speech from unwarranted governmental regulation, the Supreme
Court did not clarify this doctrine until the 1970s. This section will
consider the great shift in the Supreme Court’s treatment of
commercial speech, the current test to determine protection and the

com/prawfsblawg/first_amendment/page/2/ (Dec. 1, 2005, 05:05 PM).
25. Chi. Lawyers’ Comm. for Civil Rights Under Law, Inc. v. Craigslist, Inc., 519 F.3d
666, 668 (7th Cir. 2008).
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policy supporting this test, and the problem of prohibiting speech
regarding a legal act.
1. The Supreme Court shifts its view of the commercial speech doctrine
The Supreme Court’s treatment of commercial speech has
drastically changed since the early 1970s. For the first century and a
half of its existence, the Supreme Court did not address commercial
speech issues; the Court heard its first commercial speech case,
Valentine v. Chrestensen, in 1942.26 In Valentine, the Court
differentiated between noncommercial and commercial speech: while
“freedom of communicating information and disseminating
opinion” is highly protected under the First Amendment, purely
commercial speech is not constitutionally protected.27 Under this
rule, a regulation prohibiting leafleting was constitutionally valid
because the speech interest was purely commercial.28
In the mid-1970s, the Court’s stance on this doctrine changed
significantly. In 1975, the Court held that a Virginia statute making
it a misdemeanor to prompt the procuring of an abortion was invalid
as applied to a weekly newspaper that printed an advertisement on
how and where to get an abortion.29 In addressing the assumption of
the lower courts that the First Amendment did not protect
commercial advertisements, the Court stated that “speech is not
stripped of First Amendment protection merely because it [is] in
[commercial] form.”30
One year later, in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia
Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.,31 the Court clarified the
commercial speech doctrine: “Advertising, however tasteless and
excessive it sometimes may seem, is nonetheless dissemination of
information as to who is producing and selling what product, for

26. 316 U.S. 52 (1942), overruled by Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens
Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 758 (1976).
27. Id. at 54. Valentine has since been overruled. See Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union,
466 U.S. 485, 505 n.22 (1984); Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 65 n.6
(1983).
28. Valentine, 316 U.S. at 54–55.
29. Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 829 (1975).
30. Id. at 818 (citing Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Human Rel. Comm’n, 413 U.S. 376, 384
(1974); N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 266 (1964)).
31. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
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what reason, and at what price.”32 The Court went on to explain:
“people will perceive their own best interests if only they are well
enough informed, and that the best means to that end is to open the
channels of communication rather than to close them.”33
2. The modern commercial speech doctrine
Since 1976, the Supreme Court has continued to clarify the
extent of First Amendment protection of commercial speech and the
policy behind this protection. Recognizing that the Constitution
provides less protection to commercial speech than to other
expression, the Court in Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v.
Public Service Commission of New York laid out the test to determine
whether the First Amendment protects specific examples of
commercial speech.34 First, the speech must be legal and not
misleading—it must inform, rather than deceive, the public.35
Second, if a regulation restricts commercial speech, then three
criteria must be met: (1) the government interest in that regulation
must be substantial; (2) the regulation must directly advance the
asserted government interest; and (3) the regulation must be
narrowly tailored to serve that interest.36
The Supreme Court has also continued to clarify the policy
behind a limited First Amendment protection of free speech. A
recurring rationale is that commercial speech is worth protecting
because it disseminates information and thereby allows people to
perceive their best interests.37 Additionally, commercial speech is
“hardier” than other types of expression—it is not “particularly
susceptible to being crushed by overbroad regulation.”38 Limited
regulation is appropriate because some forms of advertising such as
32. Id. at 765.
33. Id. at 770.
34. 447 U.S. 557, 562–66 (1980).
35. Id. at 563–64.
36. Id. at 564–66; see also 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 505
(1996). In 44 Liquormart, the Court clarified that bans on “truthful, nonmisleading [sic]”
commercial speech generally “serve only to obscure an ‘underlying governmental policy’ that
could be implemented without regulating speech.” 517 U.S. at 502–03 (quoting Cent.
Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566 n.9)
37. Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 561–62; see also Linmark Ass’n, Inc. v. Willingboro, 431
U.S. 85, 92 (1977).
38. Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 564 n.6 (quoting Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S.
350, 381 (1977)); 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 485.
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untruthful or misleading advertisements
influence” over consumers.39

may

exert

“undue

3. The modern commercial speech doctrine stands, in part, for the
premise that legal action equals legal speech
Today, the commercial speech doctrine additionally stands for
the premise that while the government may restrict speech about an
illegal action, it may not restrict speech about a legal action.40 The
Court, in both Virginia Pharmacy and Central Hudson, advocated
an approach based on consistency, stating that a state could not
completely suppress the “dissemination of concededly truthful
information about entirely lawful activity.”41 In other words, the
government must be consistent because supporting an act while
simultaneously disallowing speech regarding that act will almost
always fail the Central Hudson test.
While it is clear that the Court in Virginia Board and Central
Hudson advocated this consistency approach, commentators today
are occasionally confused by a mid-1980s exception to this
doctrine.42 In Posadas de Puerto Rico Associates v. Tourism Company
of Puerto Rico, the Court considered the constitutionality of a Puerto
Rican statute that restricted the advertising of casino gambling to
Puerto Ricans even though the underlying conduct—gambling—was
legal.43 The Court reasoned that because the Puerto Rican legislature
could have prohibited Puerto Rican residents from engaging in
casino gambling, the legislature necessarily had the lesser power to
ban advertising of casino gambling.44
Ten years later, however, in 44 Liquormart, the Supreme Court
explicitly rejected its Posadas analysis to reaffirm that blanket bans on
speech about legal actions must be reviewed with “special care” and
are rarely constitutional.45 Because the ban in Posadas was designed
to “keep truthful, nonmisleading [sic] speech from members of the
public” for their protection, the state legislature was engaging in
39. 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 498 (citing Bates, 433 U.S. at 366).
40. See id. at 502–03.
41. 425 U.S. 748, 773 (1976).
42. See, e.g., Posting of Will Baude to PrawfsBlawg, http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/
prawfsblawg/first_amendment/page/2/ (Dec. 1, 2005, 05:05 PM).
43. 478 U.S. 328, 333–34 (1986).
44. Id. at 345–46.
45. 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 485 (citing Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566 n.9).
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inappropriate paternalism.46 The Court rejected the Posadas holding
and reverted to the “unbroken line of prior cases [which strike]
down similarly broad regulations on truthful, nonmisleading [sic]
advertising when non-speech-related alternatives [are] available.”47
B. The Commercial Speech Doctrine Promotes Free Speech Concerning
Legal Actions, Yet Section 3604(c) Prohibits Speech Concerning Lawful
Advertisements
Combining the commercial speech doctrine with section 3604(c)
of the FHA is inherently problematic. Section 3604(c) outlaws
discriminatory housing advertisements, yet allows discrimination in
choosing roommates. This situation clearly violates the commercial
speech doctrine’s premise that the government may not restrict
speech about a legal action. Consequently, under the commercial
speech doctrine, section 3604(c) is unconstitutional as it applies to
those who may lawfully discriminate.
The following analysis will explain how section 3604(c) became
unconstitutional; it will likewise address the analytical flaws in the
post-44 Liquormart cases that have consistently held that section
3604(c) withstands all First Amendment challenges. This analysis
will demonstrate how legislators have ignored assertions that section
3604(c) is unconstitutional as applied to those who may legally
discriminate.
1. Before 44 Liquormart, the commercial speech doctrine was
compatible with section 3604(c)
When Congress passed the FHA in 1968, the commercial speech
doctrine and section 3604(c) were not yet incompatible. In 1968,
the Supreme Court was still operating under its rule from Valentine
that the First Amendment did not protect commercial speech.48 For
example, four years after Congress passed the FHA, in United States
v. Hunter, a newspaper publisher who had violated the FHA by
advertising a room for rent in a “white home” asked the Fourth
Circuit Court to overturn section 3604(c) because it violated the
First Amendment.49 However, the court dismissed the First
46.
47.
48.
49.

1350
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Id.
Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 54 (1942).
459 F.2d 205, 209, 211 (4th Cir. 1972).
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Amendment claim after applying the commercial speech doctrine of
the time. The court reasoned that the publisher had no valid claim
because the First Amendment did not protect commercial speech.50
Since Hunter, however, the Supreme Court has fundamentally
changed the commercial speech doctrine, and commercial speech
now receives limited constitutional protection.51 Specifically, in 1996
the Court in 44 Liquormart affirmed that legislation restricting
speech about a legal action rarely protects consumers and, so long as
non-speech related alternatives are available, fails the “narrowly
tailored” prong of the Central Hudson test and is thus
unconstitutional.52 Because less restrictive alternatives to 3604(c)
exist—from regulating the publishers of discriminatory materials to
providing moral or other incentives to nondiscriminatory speech—
the constitutionality of section 3604(c) as applied to those who may
lawfully discriminate in tenant choice (such as roommates) is highly
suspect.
2. Courts have consistently failed to recognize the holding in 44
Liquormart
Although the Supreme Court fundamentally changed the
commercial speech doctrine in 44 Liquormart, courts have not
recognized how this change affects the constitutionality of section
3604(c). Courts uniformly reject section 3604(c) challenges based
on the First Amendment while maintaining that discriminatory
housing speech, even by those who may legally discriminate, is not
constitutionally protected.53 Courts generally cite three cases as the
basis of their rejection of First Amendment challenges to section
3604(c),54 and each case is faulty and constitutes bad law when
currently applied to speech regarding roommate choice.
50. See id. (citing Valentine, 316 U.S. at 54).
51. See Part III.A.1.
52. 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 502–03, 507; see supra notes 39–40 and accompanying
text.
53. See United States v. Space Hunters, Inc., 429 F.3d 416 (2d Cir. 2005); Ragin v.
N.Y. Times Co., 923 F.2d 995 (2d Cir. 1991); Hunter, 459 F.2d at 205. For a summary of
Supreme Court assertions that section 3604(c) does not violate First Amendment protections
of commercial speech, see William H. Danne, Jr., Annotation, Validity, Construction, and
Application of § 804(c) of Civil Rights Act of 1968 (Fair Housing Act) (42 U.S.C.A. § 3604(c))
Prohibiting Discriminatory Notice, Statement, or Advertisement with Respect to Sale or Rental of
Dwelling, 142 A.L.R. FED. 1, §§ 20–22 (2008).
54. See Danne, supra note 53, at §§ 20–22; see also Hunter, 459 F.2d at 211.
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First, courts cite United States v. Hunter, the 1972 case that
cited Valentine to reject a publisher’s assertion that section 3604(c)
violated his constitutional right to discriminate by including the
words “white home” in his advertisement.55 However, as discussed
above, the Hunter decision pre-dated the Court’s decision in 44
Liquormart; thus, the Hunter decision did not follow the Supreme
Court’s new interpretation of the commercial speech doctrine.
Because commercial speech now receives limited protection pursuant
to 44 Liquormart, Hunter is outdated law.
Second, courts cite Ragin v. New York Times Co., a 1991 case
heard in the Second Circuit.56 In Ragin, a group of black prospective
home purchasers sued the New York Times, alleging that the models
used in housing advertisements in the newspaper indicated a racial
preference that violated section 3604(c) of the FHA.57 In response
to the Times’ claim that section 3604(c) was unconstitutional, the
Second Circuit found that because housing discrimination was illegal
the government could regulate “commercial speech related to [that]
illegal activity.”58
While Ragin is valid in application to newspapers or those who
rent or sell multiple dwellings, it is inapplicable in the roommate
scenario. The New York Times was a large entity that, unlike
roommates, did not fit under the Mrs. Murphy Exception of section
3603(b)(2).59 Because the New York Times could not legally
discriminate, there was no inconsistency in holding that its
discriminatory speech was unprotected and was illegal under section
3604(c). This situation contrasts with a scenario where an individual
(such as one searching for a roommate or a housemate), advertises
directly because the individual may legally discriminate under the
Mrs. Murphy Exception. The analysis in Ragin does not apply to
those advertising for a roommate.
Third, courts have begun to cite a more recent case, United
States v. Space Hunters, Inc., in which a housing coordinator who
operated a housing hotline offensively refused to help a deaf man
who called the hotline.60 The Second Circuit relied on both Ragin
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.

1352

Hunter, 459 F.2d at 209, 211 (citing Valentine, 316 U.S. at 54).
923 F.2d 995 (2d Cir. 1991).
Id. at 998.
Id. at 1002–03 (internal citations omitted).
See 42 U.S.C. § 3603(b)(2) (2006).
429 F.3d 416 (2d Cir. 2005).
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and Hunter to state that “[c]ourts have consistently found that
commercial speech that violates section [3604(c)] is not protected by
the First Amendment.”61 However, because the court in Space
Hunters reached its conclusion by relying on the outdated cases of
Ragin and Hunter, the court in Space Hunters based its holding on
bad law.
IV. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF SECTION 3604(C) IN LIGHT OF
THE RIGHT TO FREEDOM OF INTIMATE ASSOCIATION
In addition to being unconstitutional on commercial speech
grounds, section 3604(c) is likely also unconstitutional because it
unduly burdens the right to freedom of intimate association. While
the precise limits of the right to freedom of intimate association are
unknown, the Supreme Court has provided some clear examples of
associations that are protected and that are not protected and has
clarified both the factors and the policies that help determine
whether an association is protected. This Part examines this
framework and argues that based on Supreme Court guidelines,
precedent, and policies, roommate associations are constitutionally
protected and that section 3604(c) unconstitutionally burdens
roommate associations.
A. The Basics of Intimate Association
The word “intimate” or “intimacy” may connote a sexual
relationship; however, the term means much more. Possible
definitions include “marked by a warm friendship developing
through long association,”62 “suggesting informal warmth or
privacy,”63 “closely acquainted,”64 and “having sexual relations.”65
The word is vague, with possible applications to relationships
ranging from exclusive clubs to the closeness of a marital
relationship.
Just as the word “intimate” is vague, the law regarding the
constitutional right to freedom of intimate association has its origins

61. Id. at 425 (citing Ragin, 923 F.2d at 1002–03; United States v. Hunter, 459 F.2d
205, 211–13 (4th Cir. 1972)).
62. MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 656 (11th ed. 2003).
63. Id.
64. OXFORD AMERICAN DICTIONARY AND THESAURUS 786 (Am. ed. 2003).
65. Id.
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in one of the “least stable” of constitutional doctrines.66 The
Supreme Court has never provided an “explicit articulation” on
which associations are protected;67 however, case law does provide
some definable limits and guidelines to this doctrine.68
For example, case law indicates the strength of the intimateassociation right and the applicable standard of review. Where courts
find a right to freedom of intimate association, the government may
only intrude upon that right if it provides justification for
“impairment of the values of intimate association.”69 This standard of
review depends on where the association falls on a “sliding scale,”
and thus requires “candid interest balancing.”70 In addition, while
standards of review may differ, if marital relations or “‘choices
concerning family living arrangements’” are involved, a reviewing
court must apply strict scrutiny to determine the validity of the
regulation.71
Roberts v. United States Jaycees provides perhaps the most
comprehensive analysis of the right to intimate association.72 In
Roberts, the Supreme Court clearly stated that the Bill of Rights,
particularly the First Amendment, provides “certain kinds of highly
personal relationships a substantial measure of sanctuary from
unjustified interference by the state.”73 Thus, the Supreme Court
protected intimate relationships, which are fundamental and integral
to liberty and identity, from government intrusion.74
The right to freedom of intimate association does not extend
indefinitely. Instead, the Constitution protects only those
relationships that “by their nature, involve deep attachments and
commitments to the necessarily few other individuals with whom

66. Kenneth L. Karst, The Freedom of Intimate Association, 89 YALE L.J. 624, 625
(1980).
67. Id.
68. Id. at 626–27.
69. Id. at 627; see also Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 363 (1976) (plurality opinion) (“If
the State has open to it a less drastic way of satisfying its legitimate interests, it may not choose
a legislative scheme that broadly stifles the exercise of fundamental personal liberties.” (internal
citations omitted)).
70. Karst, supra note 66, at 628.
71. Id. at 627–28 (citing Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499 (1977)
(plurality opinion)).
72. 468 U.S. 609 (1984).
73. Id. at 618.
74. See infra Part IV.B.1.a.
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one shares not only a special community of thoughts, experiences,
and beliefs but also distinctively personal aspects of one’s life.”75
Generally, relationships are protected only where they are
distinguished by (1) the inclusion of relatively few people, (2) the
use of “a high degree of selectivity in decisions to begin and
maintain the affiliation,” and (3) the “seclusion from others in
critical aspects of the relationship.”76
B. Limitations on Intimate Association
While the test that the Supreme Court has provided is relatively
vague, the Court has provided further limits. Both the policy behind
the right to freedom of intimate association and case law provide an
understanding of the murky borders of this right.
1. Policy and values underlying intimate association and privacy rights
The policy underlying intimate association generally stems from
the necessity of protecting the rights of intimate association, the
historic belief about the sanctity of the home, and the necessity of
protecting the less intimate relationships in order to protect the
more intimate relationships.
a. Emotional enrichment and self-identification. The Supreme
Court has indicated, at least in part, the policy behind protection of
intimate association. Specifically, protecting intimate association is
necessary to provide shelter against government intrusion into
certain relationships because “individuals draw much of their
emotional enrichment from close ties with others”77 and because
“[p]rotecting these relationships from unwarranted state interference
therefore safeguards the ability independently to define one’s identity
that is central to any concept of liberty.”78
Writing on the human need for emotional enrichment, Kenneth
L. Karst states that a fundamental benefit of intimate association is
the chance to love and care for another as well as the chance to be
loved and “to be cared for by another in an intimate association.”79
Because caring for another requires a “patient effort to know him,
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

Roberts, 468 U.S. at 619–20.
Id. at 620.
Id. at 619.
Id.
Karst, supra note 66, at 632.
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trust him, hope for him, and help him develop,” it implies personal
commitment.80 Just as one person can only have a personal
commitment to a limited number of people, the time and energy
required to know and to deal with a whole person “limits the
number of intimate associations any one person can have.”81
Similarly, addressing the Supreme Court’s focus in Roberts v.
United States Jaycees on the human need to “independently . . .
define one’s identity,”82 Karst explains that it is through intimate
associations that a person has the best opportunity both to see
himself and to be seen as “a whole person rather than as an
aggregate of social roles.”83 Consequently, “[w]hether one’s intimate
associations be affirming or destructive or both, they have a great
deal to do with the formation and shaping of an individual’s sense of
his own identity.”84
b. Privacy and sanctity of the home. Both natural law and
constitutional law affirm that an individual has a right to privacy,
especially within his own home. While the right to freedom of
intimate association stems from the First Amendment, the right to
privacy is a fundamental liberty guaranteed by the Fourteenth
Amendment.85
The sanctity of the home is protected because the home is a
sanctuary where privacy is expected and because most intimate
associations are centered in the home.86 The Constitution secures to
a person the freedom to “satisfy his intellectual and emotional needs
in the privacy of his own home.”87 Consequently, when the
government intrudes on choices concerning family living
arrangements, “the usual judicial deference to the legislature is
inappropriate.”88 In Moore v. City of East Cleveland, for example, the

80. Id.
81. Id. at 634–35.
82. 468 U.S. 609, 619 (1984).
83. Karst, supra note 66, at 635–36.
84. Id. at 635.
85. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 487 (1965).
86. Karst, supra note 66, at 634.
87. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 565 (1969) (finding that the First and
Fourteenth Amendments prevent the state from making mere possession of obscene material in
one’s own home a crime); see also Vill. of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 15 (1974)
(Marshall, J., dissenting).
88. Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, Ohio, 431 U.S. 494, 499 (1977) (plurality
opinion).
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Court found a zoning ordinance that made it illegal for a
grandmother to live with her two grandsons to be a violation of due
process.89 Further, a whole line of other cases recognize that there
exists a “private realm of family life which the state cannot enter.”90
c. Protecting short-lived relationships protects durable-intimate
relationships. The Supreme Court has never specifically stated the
principal that, in order to protect deep, emotionally-enriching
relationships, some short-term or casual relationships must
necessarily be protected as well; however, this rule is implicit.
Not all marital relationships are deep and enriching, and many
are quite short—however, all are protected; similarly, some family
members merely cohabitate rather than emotionally enrich each
other—yet they are protected. The protection provided to these
relationships suggests that the right to intimate association protects
some short-term relationships (at least those that occur in the home)
where those relationships have the potential to become “durable
intimate associations.”91 “To mandate that constitutional protection
should extend only to cases of prolonged commitment requires
‘intolerable inquiries’ into extremely private, subjective feelings and
states of mind.”92
2. Limits provided by the Supreme Court
In addition to providing a theoretical guide to determine
protected associations, the Supreme Court has set some clear limits
through case law. These limits help guide analysis.
a. The clearly not protected relationships and the clearly protected
relationships. Case law provides some clear cases of associations that
are not protected. Membership in a club of large membership is not
protected;93 dance-hall patrons94 and participants in one-night stands
in motels95 are likewise not protected in their associations. These

89. Id. at 506.
90. Id. at 499 (citing Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944)).
91. Karst, supra note 66, at 633; see also Messerly, supra note 8, at 1967.
92. Messerly, supra note 8, at 1949 (quoting Karst, supra note 66, at 633).
93. Bd. of Dirs. of Rotary Int’l v. Rotary Club, 481 U.S. 537, 545–47 (1987) (based on
size of the clubs, the “inclusive” purpose, and the lack of limits on membership).
94. City of Dallas v. Stanglin, 490 U.S. 19, 24 (1989) (“It is clear beyond cavil that
dance-hall patrons, who may number 1,000 on any given night, are not engaged in the sort of
‘intimate human relationships’ referred to in Roberts.” (internal citation omitted)).
95. FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, 237 (1990) (“Any ‘personal bonds’
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associations are not sufficiently selective, exclusive, or limited in size.
They also have little likelihood of developing into deep, enriching
relationships.
Similarly, the Supreme Court has identified clear examples of
protected associations. The right to freedom of intimate association
protects marital associations,96 associations between parent and child
(through the begetting and bearing of children and “child rearing
and education”),97 and associations between cohabiting relatives.98
Similarly, the right to liberty and privacy under the Due Process
Clause protects those engaged in private sexual conduct.99
Consequently, the government may not intrude into these
relationship choices without first finding that the proposed
legislation passes strict scrutiny.100
The Supreme Court has also provided guidelines on what might
be protected. As the Supreme Court stated in Roberts, associations in
a marital relationship are clearly protected and those in a “large
business enterprise” are clearly not protected.101 However, between
the two lies “a broad range of human relationships that may make
greater or lesser claims to constitutional protection from particular
incursions by the State.”102 Determination of whether a relationship
is protected depends on where it falls on the spectrum of intimacy.
Relevant factors may include “size, purpose, policies, selectivity,”
and other pertinent characteristics.103
b. Aside from the clearly protected and the clearly not protected
relationships, it is difficult to analyze whether a relationship is
protected. For all cases falling somewhere in the middle of the

that are formed from the use of a motel room for fewer than 10 hours are not those that have
‘played a critical role in the culture and traditions of the Nation by cultivating and transmitting
shared ideals and beliefs.’” (internal citations omitted)).
96. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 383–86 (1978).
97. Carey v. Population Servs. Int’l, 431 U.S. 678, 684–86 (1977); see also Pierce v.
Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534–35 (1925).
98. Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503–04 (1977) (plurality opinion).
99. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578–79 (2003).
100. Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 634 (1984); see also Elrod v. Burns, 427
U.S. 347, 363 (1976) (“If the State has open to it a less drastic way of satisfying its legitimate
interests, it may not choose a legislative scheme that broadly stifles the exercise of fundamental
personal liberties.” (internal citations omitted)); Karst, supra note 66, at 628.
101. 468 U.S. at 620.
102. Id.
103. Id.
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intimacy spectrum, the analysis of constitutionality is blurry at best.
Although the Supreme Court has explicitly stated that it has not
limited protection to relationships between family members,104 the
Court has not provided specific guidelines as to what other
relationships qualify for protection.
Working their way across this blurry ground, courts have sent a
contradictory message in regard to associations outside the realm of
the family or of sexual intimates.105 For example, in Berrios v. State
University of New York at Stony Brook, a federal district court
examined a case where both a man’s wife and his work colleague
claimed a right to freedom of intimate association with him.106 The
court in Berrios found that where the relationship “falls outside of
the familial arena,” it is not protected.107
Despite the tendency of some lower courts to narrowly interpret
intimate association, plentiful evidence suggests that the right to
freedom of intimate association should be interpreted more broadly.
First, the Supreme Court, in contrast to the court in Berrios, has
never held that intimate association protection is limited to familial
relationships.108 Instead, the Supreme Court has held that
attachment, commitment, and sharing within the relationship qualify
an association for protection.109
Additionally, several Supreme Court Justices have affirmed that
intimate associations apply outside a familial relationship. The
Supreme Court in United States Department of Agriculture v.
Moreno explicitly considered the validity of legislation that penalized
unrelated people living as a single household.110 While the majority
determined that the legislation was invalid due to the lack of a
rational basis in the classification,111 Justice Douglas in his concurring
opinion affirmed that the choice of one’s associates, including those
with whom one lives, is “basic in our constitutional scheme.”112
104. Bd. of Dirs. of Rotary Int’l v. Rotary Club, 481 U.S. 537, 545 (1987).
105. Berrios v. State Univ. of N.Y. at Stony Brook, 518 F. Supp. 2d 409, 418 (E.D.N.Y.
2007) (“Where, however, the relationship sought to be protected falls outside of the familial
arena, it has been held to be not similarly protected.”).
106. Id. at 420–21.
107. Id. at 418.
108. Rotary Club, 481 U.S. at 545; see also Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
109. Rotary Club, 481 U.S. at 545.
110. 413 U.S. 528 (1973).
111. Id. at 533–38.
112. Id. at 541 (Douglas, J., concurring).
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According to Justice Douglas, freedom of association is broad
enough to encompass the “right to invite the stranger into one’s
home.”113 “Taking a person into one’s home because he is poor or
needs help or brings happiness to the household is of the same
dignity” as the marital right to privacy or other rights of intimate
association that the Supreme Court has recognized.114
In addition, Justice Marshall, in his dissenting opinion in Village
of Belle Terre v. Boraas echoed Justice Douglas’ reasoning and
statements to find that a zoning restriction that prohibited a group
of students from living together should be invalid.115
Most recently, in Lawrence v. Texas,116 the Supreme Court
expanded protection of intimate associations beyond the familial
arena. In Lawrence, the Supreme Court invalidated a Texas law that
prohibited certain homosexual acts.117 The Court reasoned that
Lawrence was about far more than homosexual sex, it was about the
liberty of people to choose and conduct their personal relationships
in their own homes without being labeled and punished as
criminals.118 The Court recognized that sexuality is only “one
element in a personal bond” of intimacy; additionally, adults have
the right to this bond “in the confines of their homes” and in “their
own private lives.”119 The Court thereby indicated an expanded idea
of protection of associations beyond the family, beyond sex, and
between those who choose to live together.
C. Application in the Roommate and Housemate Scenario
The above factors and policy considerations combine for a strong
case in favor of recognizing the constitutional protection of
roommate choice and advertisements furthering that choice.
Roommate associations meet the Supreme Court’s factor test to
determine protection; additionally, the policies and values underlying

113. Id. at 543; see also Vill. of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 18 (1974) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting) (stating that the freedom of association is broad enough to encompass the “‘right
to invite the stranger into one’s home’ not only for ‘entertainment’ but to join the household
as well” (quoting Moreno, 413 U.S. at 438–45)).
114. Moreno, 413 U.S. at 542 (Douglas, J., concurring).
115. 416 U.S. at 18 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
116. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
117. Id. at 562.
118. Id. at 567.
119. Id.
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intimate association support the premise that roommate associations
are valuable and merit constitutional protection.
1. Analyzing roommate situations under the Supreme Court’s
protection analysis
The Supreme Court has clearly expressed protection of
relationships that “by their nature, involve deep attachments and
commitments to the necessarily few other individuals with whom
one shares not only a special community of thoughts, experiences,
and beliefs but also distinctively personal aspects of one’s life.”120
Because this test is vague, the Supreme Court has provided a list of
factors to consider: (1) small size, (2) high selectivity, (3) exclusion
of others from “critical aspects” of the relationship, and (4) the
purpose of the association.121
a. Size. Roommate and housemate situations meet the size
consideration. By necessity, roommate and housemate size is limited
by the number of people that will fit under one roof. Thus, the
number of roommates approximates the number of individuals in a
family, and the number of people involved can easily be
distinguished from the number involved in a large club or other
impersonal association.122
b. High selectivity. It is probable that many persons seeking
roommates will screen scores of applicants. Meanwhile others,
despite financial strain, will go months without a roommate while
searching for someone who possesses the qualities that they desire.
This selectivity process is not generally as extensive as that which
goes into choosing a partner in marriage. However, on the spectrum
of selectivity, the selectivity that goes into choosing with whom to
live may be second only to marriage and long-term sexual
relationships.
Occasionally, roommate selection is based on less than this high
degree of selectivity. For example, in short-term arrangements,
individuals seeking roommates will likely be able to tolerate the
presence of some roommates they would not seek for the long-term.
Additionally, individuals may exercise a lower degree of selectivity
where finances are pressing and an immediate roommate is necessary
120. Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 619–20 (1984).
121. Id. at 620.
122. Id.
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or in dormitory situations where a university board may make the
selections. However, it is likely that most people will fear the
negative repercussions of a negative roommate experience and will
exercise a high amount of selectivity in roommate choice.
c. Exclusion. Roommate scenarios are likely sufficiently
“exclusive” in “critical aspects of the relationship”123 to meet this
part of the factor test. “Exclusive” means simply that others are not
privy to or invited to participate in certain elements.124 Additionally,
because freedom of intimate association extends to those not
involved in a sexual relationship,125 “critical aspects” clearly involves
something more general.
Cases in which a court has upheld constitutional protection of a
relationship generally involve a relationship within the privacy of the
home.126 In sharing the privacy of a home, household members are
necessarily exclusive in their relationships, in their financial
discussions, in their arguments, in their personal knowledge of each
other’s personal habits, and more. Finding that exclusivity is met
where a small number of individuals live in a common household
accords with the Supreme Court’s statement that intimate
association protects relationships with the few with whom one shares
“thoughts, experiences, . . . beliefs, . . . [and] distinctively personal
aspects of one’s life.”127
d. Purpose of the association. While “purpose of the association” is
also a vague factor, it is likely that roommate scenarios meet it. While
the Supreme Court has declined to explicitly define this term, it is
likely that the Supreme Court is indicating that intimate association
is not meant to protect relationships with a casual purpose—
constitutional protection should extend only to purposes involving
“deep attachments and commitments.”128 Because of this, the
Supreme Court has found a lack of protection where the purpose is

123. Id.; see also Bd. of Dirs. of Rotary Int’l v. Rotary Club, 481 U.S. 537, 545 (1987).
124. MERRIAM-WEBSTER, supra note 62, at 436.
125. See Carey v. Population Servs. Int’l, 431 U.S. 678, 684–86 (1977); Pierce v. Soc’y
of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534–35 (1925).
126. See, e.g., Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 383–86 (1978); Carey, 431 U.S. at
684–86; Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503–04 (1977) (plurality opinion);
Pierce, 268 U.S. at 534–35.
127. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 619–20.
128. Id. at 620.
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general society (such as in clubs)129 or sexual relations alone.130 Not
only are relationships with club members or prostitutes fleeting and
often shallow, but these relationships have a very low likelihood of
ever developing into a deep attachment worthy of protection.
Accordingly, it seems likely that the right to freedom of intimate
association protects relationships that indicate the inherent potential
to develop into deep attachments. Associations with those with
whom one shares living space and to whom one will likely turn for
emotional support, constant society, and emergency help likely have
a sufficiently intimate purpose to warrant protection.
2. Protecting roommate associations supports the policies underlying
intimate association
Just as the associations of roommates seem to meet the Supreme
Court’s factor tests that determine protection, the policies and values
underlying intimate association support the premise that roommate
associations are of sufficient value to merit constitutional protection.
Specifically, the fundamental values inherent in protected
relationships, the sanctity of the home, and protection of the possibly
short-term in order to protect the long-term all support extending
the right to freedom of intimate association to roommate
associations.
a. Emotional enrichment and self-identification. Roommate
scenarios provide sources of emotional enrichment. While some
roommates will admittedly share the kitchen and nothing more,
many other roommate relationships will develop into close
friendships and support systems. So long as roommates get beyond
shallow initial relationships, they will try to know, trust, hope for,
and help each other where possible.131 Due to close quarters and
emotional and social ties, another roommate’s well-being often
becomes the deep concern of all inhabitants. Emotional enrichment
is provided as other roommates take “the trouble to know him and
deal with him as a whole person, not just as the occupant of a
role.”132

129.
130.
131.
132.

Bd. of Dirs. of Rotary Int’l v. Rotary Club, 481 U.S. 537, 546–47 (1987).
See FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, 237 (1990).
Karst, supra note 66, at 632.
Id. at 634.
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Regardless of the relationship between them, roommates see
each other with their defenses down, in pajamas, doing quirky or
lazy things. In other words, inside the home individuals engage in
behaviors that are often hidden from the public. Therefore, because
roommates experience each other’s personal circumstances and
behaviors, each roommate’s opinion and affirmation may be highly
important. Consequently, “[t]he choice of household companions—
of whether a person’s ‘intellectual and emotional needs’ are best met
by living with family, friends, professional associates, or others”133—
requires deep and personal deliberation. The right to freedom of
intimate association is intended to protect precisely these values.
b. Privacy and sanctity of the home. The privacy doctrine, relying
heavily on the sanctity of the home, makes no distinction between
those who live within the walls of the home. This doctrine provides a
haven and recognizes the natural right to establish a home and
choose with whom one associates within its walls.
Additionally, because roommate relationships often substitute for
family relationships, the roommate relationship is traditionally
protected under privacy doctrine. Privacy doctrine protects not just
the home, but also “the life which characteristically has its place in
the home.”134 Just as family members ideally meet a person’s
“intellectual and emotions needs” as a child, an adult makes the
choice as to who will best meet her needs—family, friends,
coworkers, or others.135 These decisions determine “the kind and
quality of intimate relationships within the home.”136 Consequently,
these decisions involve the personal and emotional considerations
that form the right to privacy protected by the Constitution.
c. Protecting the short-term to protect the long-term. While some
roommates do share enduring emotional attachments, others merely
share a kitchen and may only see each other in passing. However,
marital and family relationships are constitutionally protected not
because they are necessarily intimate but because they are located
within the privacy of the home and have the potential to become

133. Vill. of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 16 (1974) (Marshall, J., dissenting)
(citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973)).
134. Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 504 n.12 (1977) (plurality opinion)
(citing Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 551 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting)).
135. See Belle Terre, 416 U.S. at 16 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
136. Id.
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intimate relationships.137 While not all roommate relationships will
have the same depth and commitment as these familial relationships,
the possibility (and modicum of likelihood) of intimacy requires
protection.
3. The Supreme Court’s decision in Belle Terre
The Supreme Court’s analysis in a 1974 case, Village of Belle
Terre v. Boraas, initially seems contrary to an assertion that
roommate associations are constitutionally protected. However, the
Court’s holding in Belle Terre and protection of roommate intimate
association rights can peacefully coexist.
In Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, a group of six unrelated
students moved into a Long Island house that was zoned to prevent
more than two unrelated people from living together.138 After
villagers raised a complaint, the case went all the way to the Supreme
Court, which upheld the zoning ordinance as rationally related to
the purpose of the ordinance.139 The Court disregarded the students’
claim to freedom of association.140
Justice Marshall, however, provided a well-reasoned dissenting
opinion stating that the zoning ordinance “burdens the students’
fundamental rights of association and privacy guaranteed by the First
and Fourteenth Amendments.”141 According to Justice Marshall’s
rationale, while the policies behind the ordinance were valid, the city
could have upheld its policies without sacrificing the students’
constitutional rights.142
In finding that Justice Marshall was correct in stating that the
right to freedom of intimate association protects roommate
associations, a court need not find that zoning laws that restrict
occupancy (such as the zoning laws in Belle Terre) are
unconstitutional. While the students in Belle Terre could not live in
the village of Belle Terre, they could still live together because the
zoning law restricted only the “where,” but not the “how” or “with
whom.”

137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.

Karst, supra note 66, at 634.
Belle Terre, 416 U.S. at 2–3.
Id. at 7–8.
Id. at 8–9.
Id. at 13 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
Id. at 18.
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Conversely, restrictions on housing advertisements can make it
impossible for an individual who is seeking specific requirements in a
roommate to find such a person. While these distinctions may
initially seem minor, the result may be monumental: the Belle Terre
students could easily find a place with different zoning regulations
where they could live together as they desired; however, an
individual seeking a roommate may be completely unable to legally
find and establish a home—anywhere—with a person who meets her
qualifications.143 Because the burden on those unable to advertise
their criteria is far heavier than the burden on those who are simply
restricted from certain neighborhoods, advertising restrictions are far
more constitutionally suspect.
D. Section 3604(c) Substantially Burdens the Right
Intimate Association

to

As the above section demonstrates, the right to freedom of
intimate association affords individuals the substantive right to
discriminate in actual choice of roommate; however, it is still possible
to argue that the government may both recognize this substantive
right and simultaneously burden this right by prohibiting
discriminatory advertisements. In this line of analysis, so long as the
substantive right is preserved, partial regulation is valid; additionally,
because commercial speech is subject to a lower level of protection,
the government is particularly free to regulate commercial housing
speech.144 However, while the government may regulate to an
extent, laws prohibiting individuals from advertising for a roommate
are excessively burdensome and invalid.
The Supreme Court has established that a law that imposes a
direct and substantial burden on an intimate relationship is subject to
strict scrutiny; alternatively, if a law does not impose a direct and
substantial burden, it is subject only to rational basis review.145
Consequently, if section 3604(c) does not amount to a direct and
substantial burden on intimate association, it is almost certainly valid
under rational basis review. Government action is considered to place
a direct and substantial burden where “a large portion of those

143. See infra Part IV.D.
144. E.g., Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S.
557, 564 (1980).
145. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 383–87 (1978).
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affected by the rule are absolutely or largely prevented from [forming
intimate associations],” or where “those affected by the rule are
absolutely or largely prevented from [forming intimate associations]
with a large portion of [people with whom they could form intimate
associations].”146
Under this test, government prohibition of discriminatory
housing advertisements amounts to a “direct and substantial
burden.” Although other avenues exist to find a suitable
roommate—such as word of mouth or posting a non-discriminatory
advertisement and then discriminating in practice—public
advertisements are often essential. Consequently, by limiting the
legal means of finding a suitable roommate, section 3604(c)
substantially burdens roommate associations from forming with a
“large portion” of the roommate pool.147
The fact that 3604(c) burdens only commercial speech does not
change the “substantial burden” analysis. While the Constitution
gives lowered protection to commercial speech, the rationale for
lowered protection is unsound when applied to roommate
advertisements.148 Commercial speech is accorded less protection
largely because commercial speakers “have extensive knowledge of
both the market and their products” and can easily “evaluate . . . the
lawfulness of the underlying activity.”149 Additionally, because
commercial speakers are motivated by “economic self-interest,”
commercial speech is considered “hard[ier]” than other types of
expression—it is not “particularly susceptible to being crushed by
overbroad regulation.”150
Individuals seeking roommates are distinctly different from the
supposed commercial speaker. First, these individuals are generally
unfamiliar with the housing market and housing laws. They are
motivated in part by economic self-interest, but their desire for a
comfortable living situation generally far outweighs economic
interest. The speech of these individuals is not “hardier” than other
speech—it is often particularly susceptible to overbroad regulations.

146. Anderson v. City of LaVergne, 371 F.3d 879, 882 (6th Cir. 2004); see also Vaughn
v. Lawrenceburg Power Sys., 269 F.3d 703, 710 (6th Cir. 2001).
147. Anderson, 371 F.3d at 882.
148. See Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 564.
149. Id. at 564 n.6 (quoting Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 381 (1977)).
150. Id. (quoting Bates, 433 U.S. at 381); see also Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va.
Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 771–72 n.24 (1976).
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V. POSSIBLE OPTIONS THAT BALANCE ANTI-DISCRIMINATION
LAWS AND CONSTITUTIONAL VALUES
While the last decades have seen vast improvement in tolerance
and acceptance, discrimination based on race, religion, handicap, and
other factors continues to be a significant issue in this country.
Consequently, Congress and the courts face a hard decision—decide
whether to maintain the status quo, find a way to uphold 3604(c)
while still upholding the First Amendment, or adopt a narrow
exception to section 3604(c)’s ban on discriminatory advertising.
A. The Immediate Objection: Discrimination is Real
There is no doubt about it, discrimination remains a pertinent
issue in the United States. While incidences of discrimination against
minorities have decreased significantly in the last several decades,151
discrimination continues.152 While other aspects of the civil rights
laws are deeply entrenched in society today, housing remains an area
remains
that
is
“uniquely
intractable”153—noncompliance
154
common.
Much of this discrimination is institutional, hidden in financing
procedures and insurance practices;155 some of it, however, occurs in
blatant form, both in practice and in discriminatory advertisements.
Some advertisements discriminate in bizarre ways that may amaze

151. Margery Austin Turner, Limits on Housing and Neighborhood Choice: Discrimination
and Segregation in U.S. Housing Markets, 41 IND. L. REV. 797, 799 (2008). According to
HUD reports, discrimination incidents against African-American renters declined from 26% in
1989 to 22% in 2000. Id. Blacks are now more likely to be told about the same number of
available units as comparable white renters. Id. In sales, discrimination against AfricanAmericans is down from 29% in 1989 to 17%, while discrimination against Hispanics decreased
from 27% to 20% during that time period. Id. Both minority groups are likely to be told about
the same number of available homes as whites are likely to be told. Id.
152. See, e.g., id. While discrimination against African-Americans is decreasing,
discrimination against Hispanics remained essentially unchanged from 1989 to 2000;
additionally, Hispanic renters are now more likely to be quoted a higher rent compared to
non-Hispanic whites. Id.
153. Robert G. Schwemm, Why Do Landlords Still Discriminate (And What Can Be Done
About It)?, 40 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 455, 460 (2007).
154. Id. at 459; see also Turner, supra note 151, at 799–800.
155. See, e.g., Larkin, supra note 14, at 1640–41 (outlining institutionalized practices
such as steering, lack of assistance with financing by real estate brokers, mortgage lending
practices, and housing insurance practices that affect the racial makeup of a neighborhood); see
also Turner, supra note 151, at 800–03. For a discussion on the gentrification of suburban
cities, see also Calmore, supra note 14, at 1068, 1107.
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rather than offend a reader: “‘We are 3 Christian females who Love
our Lord Jesus Christ. . . . We have weekly bible studies and biweekly times of fellowship,’”156 or “‘The female we are looking for
hopefully wont [sic] mind having a little sexual incounter [sic] with
my boyfriend and I.’ [sic]”157
However, other discriminatory ads may be harsh or derogatory,
whether on racial, religious, family, or other grounds. For example,
actual online postings cited in recent cases include the following:
“NO MINORITIES,”158 “NOT looking for black muslims [sic],” no
“smokers, kids or druggies,” “MUST be a BLACK GAY MALE,”159
and “No children.”160
This discrimination may harm society in many ways. Robert Post
has identified three types of harm that discriminatory speech,
including advertisements, creates.161 First and most obviously, racist
expression harms individuals through feelings of “humiliation,
isolation, and self-hatred.”162 This is especially true where expression
is delivered in public or by a person or entity in a powerful or
authoritative position.163 Second, discriminatory speech hurts “those
groups that are the target of the expression.”164 Finally,
discriminatory speech creates “deontic harm” as society recognizes
the “elemental wrongness” of this expression.165
B. Possible Options
Because the Constitution and anti-discrimination policies are
both highly significant, Congress and the courts will undoubtedly
face many thorny issues as they address the constitutionality of
section 3604(c). It is unnecessary to throw out either the
156. Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d
1157, 1173 n.35 (9th Cir. 2008).
157. Id. at 1173 n.34.
158. Chi. Lawyers’ Comm. for Civil Rights Under Law, Inc. v. Craigslist, Inc., 519 F.3d
666, 668 (7th Cir. 2008).
159. Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1173.
160. Craigslist, 519 F.3d at 668.
161. Robert C. Post, Racist Speech, Democracy, and the First Amendment, 32 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 267, 271–77 (1991) (quoted in Klein & Doskow, supra note 10, at 347).
162. Richard Delgado, Words that Wound: A Tort Action for Racial Insults, Epithets, and
Name-Calling, 17 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 133, 137 (1982).
163. Id. at 143.
164. Post, supra note 161, at 273–74.
165. Id. at 272.
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Constitution or the FHA; instead, Congress and the courts should
accommodate the values inherent in both by carefully considering
the costs and benefits of various options. The following outlines
three possible options that attempt to balance constitutional values
and anti-discrimination laws.
1. Option A: Ignore the unconstitutionality of section 3604(c) and
maintain the status quo
Because the Constitutional doctrines are complex and antidiscrimination policies are highly important, Congress and the courts
may prefer to continue ignoring the unconstitutionality of 3604(c)
in the roommate scenario. This option carries both possible benefits
and negative ethical ramifications.
For example, there are benefits to having stringent laws that are
leniently enforced. Constitutional law and anti-discrimination laws
are two powerful and important interests; where these laws converge
and oppose each other, strict anti-discrimination laws that are
sometimes leniently enforced may relieve some of the tension.166
Additionally, because facially stiff laws often carry a “moral force,”
lenient enforcement may be sufficient—even if actual enforcement is
relatively relaxed, the moral force of strict laws can influence
behavior.167 Consequently, people may be more likely to obey the
law, and any lenity when they do not obey is unexpected and
generally not widely known.
This method describes the status quo. Discriminatory housing
advertisements are rampant on the Internet,168 and individuals who
post discriminatory housing ads in violation of section 3604(c) are
seldom prosecuted.169 It may be that individuals seeking roommates
are simply seldom “worth” suing, but suing Roommate.com or
Craigslist may be more effective.170 However, it is also likely that the

166. See WARD FARNSWORTH, THE LEGAL ANALYST: A TOOLKIT FOR THINKING ABOUT
184 (2007).
167. See id. at 185.
168. For examples, look on any online classifieds or search “roommate” to find
roommate websites. Almost every site with housing ads will contain multiple discriminatory
statements.
169. But see infra note 172 for exceptions.
170. See Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d
1157 (9th Cir. 2008); Chi. Lawyers’ Comm. for Civil Rights Under Law, Inc. v. Craigslist,
Inc., 519 F.3d 666 (7th Cir. 2008).
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Department of Housing and Urban Development consciously
recognizes that it may be better off not strictly enforcing section
3604(c).171
Despite the possible benefits of maintaining section 3604(c)
while leniently applying it, continuing with the status quo is ethically
problematic. First, this option ignores the Constitution by
continuing to allow section 3604(c) to abrogate the constitutional
rights of those who should have recourse and protection. While
many who advertise their discriminatory requirements as they search
for an appropriate roommate never discover that this speech is illegal,
some are prosecuted and forced to pay remedies.172 These individuals
suffer in time, expense, and headache the costs of ignoring these
constitutional issues. Similarly, maintaining strict laws that are
loosely enforced hurts those who know the actual law and who wish
to abide by it. While these individuals may have a constitutional right
to advertise as they like for a roommate, a desire to be a law-abiding
citizen and the fear of consequences of breaking the law may prevent
these individuals from exercising their constitutional rights.
Second, this option does not uphold the integrity of law. Most
individuals seeking roommates are unaware that the law prohibits
them from posting discriminatory housing advertisements; as they
eventually discover that this law exists, they may be unable to
reconcile this law with their own experiences. They may possibly
conclude that the government is not serious about its antidiscrimination laws—in housing or at all. By maintaining
unconstitutional strict laws and by declining to enforce these laws,
courts may taint public perception of the entire legal scheme.

171. See 24 C.F.R. § 109.20(b)(5) (1994) (withdrawn). 24 C.F.R. pt. 109(b)(5), laying
forth HUD policy, formerly stated that advertisements indicating that the housing was
available only to persons of a single sex were invalid; however, this section did not apply
“where the sharing of living areas” was involved. While this regulation was withdrawn in 1996,
it likely continues to reflect HUD’s enforcement policy. National Fair Housing Advocate
Online, 24 C.F.R. 109.20 Use of words, phrases, symbols, and visual aids, http://www.
fairhousing.com/index.cfm?method=page.display&pagename=regs_fhr_109-20 (last visited
Nov. 2, 2009).
172. See, e.g., State ex rel Sprague v. City of Madison, 205 Wis. 2d 110 (Wis. Ct. App.
1996) (review of case requiring roommates who discriminated against another woman to pay
almost $30,000 in attorney’s fees and compensatory and punitive damages); Dep’t of Fair
Employment and Hous. v. De Santis, FEHC Dec. No. 02-12, 2002 WL 1313078 (Cal.
F.E.H.C. 2002) (case in which a woman was sued after she admitted to a housing “tester” that
she was scared to live with a black man); see also Messerly, supra note 8, at 1958.
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2. Option B: Uphold section 3604(c) without disregarding the First
Amendment
A second option is for Congress and the courts to fully uphold
3604(c) while still upholding the First Amendment. The courts
could do this by narrowly reading the right to freedom of intimate
association and by creating an exception to the commercial speech
doctrine.
a. Narrow interpretation of intimate association rights. Courts
may narrowly interpret the right to freedom of intimate association
by finding that this right exists only within familial and sexual
relationships. This limit would continue to uphold past findings of
intimate association rights173 but would curtail expansion that would
protect unrelated adults who platonically cohabitate.
This interpretation would mesh well with some lower-court
decisions;174 however, it would also require a substantive withdrawal
from the Supreme Court’s rationale and rules as articulated in
Roberts v. United States Jaycees.175 Specifically, this interpretation
would ignore the policy of protecting relationships that afford deep
emotional enrichment and identity;176 the current test of protecting
based on size, selectivity, exclusion;177 and the assurance that
protection may extend beyond family.178 It would additionally rest
on some arbitrary limits.179
b. Finding an exception under the commercial speech doctrine.
Courts may create an exception to the commercial speech doctrine
that allows them to both uphold the constitutionality of 3604(c) and
retain the commercial speech doctrine without much alteration. In
response to increased realization of the constitutional dilemma that

173. See supra Part III.B.2.a.
174. See, e.g., Berrios v. State Univ. of N.Y. at Stony Brook, 518 F. Supp. 2d 409
(E.D.N.Y. 2007).
175. Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 620 (1984).
176. Id. at 619; see also Citizens for Equal Protection, Inc. v. Bruning, 368 F. Supp. 2d
980, 992 (D. Neb. 2005).
177. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 620.
178. Bd. of Dirs. of Rotary Int’l v. Rotary Club, 481 U.S. 537, 545 (1987).
179. For example, this Author currently lives with two roommates. She and roommate A
grew up in the same hometown and went to the same high school. She met roommate B only
recently; after roommate B moved in with her, she discovered that she and roommate B are
distant cousins. An arbitrary familial protection might protect the more casual short-term
relationship with roommate B while not protecting the relationship with roommate A.
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section 3604(c) and commercial speech doctrine create, academics
have begun to theorize how section 3604(c) may still be
constitutional.180 They offer theories that would create only minor
changes to the constitutional speech doctrine while also finding that
individuals who may legally discriminate in roommate choice may
still not advertise their discriminatory criteria.
The most plausible theory suggests that 44 Liquormart should
stand for the requirement that the government must “articulate a
unified rationale with respect to regulated subject matter” and that
the government may not enact schizophrenic legislation.181 Under
this interpretation, where “speech about the activity creates a harm
that is distinct from permitting the activity itself,”182 the government
may be able to restrict commercial speech about a legal activity
because the speech “creates an analytically separate warrant for its
restriction.”183
The legal community is likely to accept this interpretation. First,
it appears to square, at least in part, with Supreme Court analysis. In
Virginia Pharmacy, the Court attacked a statute intended to protect
the public for supposedly harmful information. Criticizing the statute
as paternalistic, the Court stated that it was determined “to assume”
that the information was not harmful.184 By presenting evidence of a
separate harm that discriminatory speech creates, courts supporting
this theory may rebut the Supreme Court’s assumption of a lack of
harm and thereby create an exception to the commercial speech
doctrine.
Several scholars have posited that discriminatory housing
advertisements create social harms that differ from the harms that
actual discrimination creates, and the most forceful arguments state
that discriminatory speech creates psychic damage separate from the
damage inflicted by the act of discrimination. Unannounced
discrimination in actual choice of roommates may hurt those actually
searching for housing, but may not affect the general public;185 in

180. See also Klein & Doskow, supra note 10, at 375. See generally http://prawfsblawg.
blogs.com/prawsblawg/first_amendment/, (Feb. 15, 2006 and Dec. 1, 2005).
181. Posting of Dave Fagundes to Prawfsblawg, supra note 24.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748,
770 (1976).
185. Posting of Dave Fagundes to Prawfsblawg, supra note 24.
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contrast, discriminatory advertisements may “generate interethnic
animosity and social divisiveness.”186 The Second Circuit, in United
States v. Space Hunters, Inc., supported this rationale while saying
that section 3604(c) was intended to “protect[] against the psychic
injury,” which discriminatory housing statements create.187 In the
same way that “[e]very person of color who ever walked by a
restaurant, motel, restroom, or water fountain with a sign reading
WHITES ONLY was damaged by that experience even if he or she
had no occasion to enter the restaurant, motel, or restroom, or drink
from the fountain,”188 the case may be made that every person who
sees a discriminatory housing advertisement—regardless of whether
he is searching for housing and being discriminated against—is
damaged.
While psychic harm is undoubtedly real and problematic, the
analysis of separate harms will always come down to semantics—the
fact that this proposed rule may be easily manipulated toward an
end. It is possible to say that discriminatory action creates a direct
harm and that discriminatory speech creates a wider harm—and that
these harms differ, but it is just as possible to say that these harms are
the same—whether a person directs the harm toward a single person
or more generally, he is creating likely divisiveness and hurt.
Because these harms are difficult to measure and to distinguish,
they become mere tools to be manipulated toward a desired result.
This play with semantics lends itself to inconsistency and inequity.
3. Option C: Adopt a roommate advertising exception to section
3604(c)
Whether Congress finds either or both of the intimate
association argument or the commercial speech analysis compelling,
Congress has a third option: Congress may find that section 3604(c)
is unconstitutional as applied to roommate choice. Congress may
then uphold the constitutionality of 3604(c) by creating a narrow

186. Id.
187. United States v. Space Hunters, Inc., 429 F.3d 416, 424 (2d Cir. 2005) (internal
citations removed). See generally Posting of Dave Fagundes to Prawfsblawg, supra note 24.
188. See Klein & Doskow, supra note 10, at 348. Because roommate choice seems to be
an area of inherent individual discretion, most people do not even suspect that the government
has regulated their speech in this area. Additionally, because few people who actually advertise
are prosecuted, individuals have no experience with or even stories of prosecution that would
alert them to the existence of 3604(c).
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exception that allows those seeking roommates to use discriminatory
language in their advertisements. The creation of an exception would
likely have negative political ramifications but would not significantly
set back anti-discrimination legislation.
The creation of a narrow exception would likely have negative
political ramifications. While housing discrimination is not nearly as
rampant as it was when the FHA was passed,189 discrimination
continues today.190 A newspaper headline stating that “Congress
Allows Discriminatory Housing Ads” is likely to upset both those
who fear discrimination and those who are concerned with civil
rights and do not know the details of the constitutional issues.
Despite public fears, an exception to section 3604(c) recognizing
that those in the roommate scenario may legitimately advertise their
discriminatory intents likely would not significantly set back antidiscrimination efforts. First, the recognition of these constitutionallyprotected rights is unlikely to significantly alter behavior. For
example, those who are likely to be discriminated against are also
likely to not know their rights.191 Because people are unaware of the
law, their use or lack of use of discriminatory language is not based
on constraints of law, but on individual preference, culture, and the
desire to follow social norms.192 Consequently, they are unlikely to
increase their use of discriminatory language if they know that this
language is legal.
Second, an exception to 3604(c) would apply narrowly to
individuals and would not extend to newspapers, websites, or other
forums. The Mrs. Murphy Exception applies only to an owner who
owns or controls living quarters containing no more than four
families where she maintains and occupies one of the living quarters

189. See supra Part II.A; see also Stephen L. Ross & George C. Galster, Fair Housing
Enforcement and Changes in Discrimination Between 1989 and 2000: An Exploratory Study
(Univ. of Conn., Working papers 2005-16, Dep’t of Econ.), available at http://ideas.
repec.org/p/uct/uconnp/2005-16.html#statistics.
190. See supra Part V.A.
191. See Klein & Doskow, supra note 10, at 342–43 (finding that many persons seeking
housing know little about anti-discrimination laws in housing). Those who advertise for
roommates are often equally unaware of these laws.
192. See generally Schwemm, supra note 153, at 508 (“[P]eople generally . . . tend to
obey laws more out of a sense of their moral value and fairness and a desire to adhere to social
norms rather than from the threat of punishment.”).
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as her residence.193 Accordingly, newspapers still could not legally
print these advertisements.194
Third, following the Ninth Circuit’s recent decision in
Roommate.com, websites may not contrive discriminatory statements
by asking discriminatory questions.195 Accordingly, this exception
would (1) extend only to individuals (and not institutions) and
would (2) cover only speech that came directly from individuals.
This exception would allow individuals to place ads on common
boards or websites such as Craigslist; it would not, however, extend
protection to print or other online sources.
A narrow exception to 3604(c) would additionally harmonize
current law and signify a step forward in anti-discrimination law. An
exception would recognize the constitutionality of what people are
already doing while removing the inconsistency in the law. While
people currently routinely break the law without repercussions,196
this change would allow people to continue their activities—but
legally.
Finally, an exception would benefit many people like Gene
Kavenoki who want to advertise for and choose a roommate based
on a “slightly warped sense of humor,” 197 attributes that they share,
or common areas of interest. Like Kavenoki, such individuals may
include technically discriminatory statements in their ads (“looking
for a girl to share small apartment,” or “preferably someone
interested in Jewish literature,” “just around the corner from a
mosque”) while intending absolutely no offense. These individuals
would be freed from the possibility of lawsuit and would receive the
benefits of being able to legally advertise.
VI. CONCLUSION
For decades, section 3604(c) of the Fair Housing Act has
prohibited discrimination in housing advertising based on race,
religion, ethnicity, gender, handicap, or familial status. Despite long193. 42 U.S.C. § 3603(b)(2) (2006).
194. Compare Ragin v. N.Y. Times Co., 923 F.2d 995 (2d Cir. 1991), with 42 U.S.C. §
3604(c) (2006).
195. Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d
1157, 1169 (9th Cir. 2007).
196. See Turner, supra note 151, at 805 (showing that few people who experience
discrimination take action).
197. Liptak, supra note 1.
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term and widespread acceptance of the constitutionality of this law,
section 3604(c) is unconstitutional under the commercial speech
doctrine and under the right to freedom of intimate association. Real
tension exists between anti-discrimination policies and constitutional
rights; therefore, Congress and the courts must carefully consider
how to best accommodate the values of both core constitutional
rights and important anti-discrimination policies. While some
compromise will be necessary, it is possible to accommodate both
values.
Brooke Wright

 J.D., 2009, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University. Many thanks
to Professor John Fee for his help and encouragement.
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